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Introduction
Since the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on America the study
of Pakistan in the social sciences has grown both in scholarly stature
and global importance. New works on Pakistan are one dimension of
the rash of recent publications on ‘political Islam’, and this growing
body of literature includes both popular andmore scholarly accounts of
contemporary Pakistan.1 Many such works, however, have suffered as
a result of both their hasty preparation and their inadequate attempts
to relate their accounts of religion and politics in Pakistan to the so-
called ‘war on terror’. The least sophisticated of such studies represent
Pakistan as a country awash with ‘fundamentalist Muslims’ in the
process of passively and unthinkingly embracing the ‘Talibanisation’
of their lives (e.g. Levy 2003). The relatively more sophisticated of
these recent accounts claim that Pakistan is a complex nation-state
in which there is a wide variety of different ways of being Muslim
1 For scholarly contributions, see Nasr 2001, Jaffrelot (ed.) 2002(a) Jafrelot (ed.)
2002(b). Recent journalistic accounts include Bennett Jones 2002.
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but that, in the context of the present day, it is the parties of so-
called ‘reformist Islam’ that are all powerful, and the authority of
their leaders is something that goes largely unchallenged.2
The central aim of this article is to explore the significance of three
recent works for the study of politics and religion in contemporary
Pakistan. At the same time, I seek to highlight themes in the study of
Pakistan society that would benefit either from a greater attention
by social scientists, or a renewed attention through theoretical
comparisons which, whilst now central to the study of both other South
Asian states and Muslim-majority countries, are rarely recognised as
being relevant for the study of Pakistan.
One of the distinguishing features about the works explored here
is the important emphasis they place on comparison with other
South Asian countries andMuslim-majority states. With some notable
exceptions (e.g. Jalal 1995), there is a lingering tendency for Pakistan
specialists to depict ‘Pakistani Islam’ as unique and distinct. For
instance, the Islamic tradition in Pakistan is often said to have been
detached from its broader South Asian past, at the same time as
having little in common with the so-called Islamic heartlands of the
Middle East. Moreover, it is not only the form of Islam in Pakistan
that has been treated in this way: the study of political culture in
Pakistan is also largely held to be as much about the ongoing legacies
of subcontinent’s partition as the forms of social transformations
that have occurred since 1947. Indeed, in much of the large body of
literature on Pakistan, years of military rule, antagonistic relations
with neighbouring countries, and a state that is both unable and
unwilling to challenge the power of the country’s elite classes in its
political structure as well as culture, have overshadowed the forms of
transformation that Pakistanis themselves have actively engaged in
since independence.
The lack of a detailed approach to social, religious and political
transformation in the study of Pakistan is important, and deserves
further explanation. One reason for the eclipsing of the form taken
by social and political change and transformation in contemporary
Pakistan in much recent work on Pakistan is the lack of any in-depth
study of Pakistan’s political culture as opposed to its political structure.
In particular, there are few detailed studies into the forms taken by
2 Many of the articles on Islam in Pakistan in Jaffrelot (ed.) 2001 which emphasise
the power of complex networks of Islamist political parties in Pakistan give the
impression that the teachings and messages of such movements go unquestioned.
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political and religious action and mobilisation in Pakistan, despite the
historical and contemporary importance that an array of movements
ranging from so-called ‘secular’ political parties to religious and ethnic
movements have played in the country’s recent political fortunes.
Instead, theoretically sophisticated yet largely top-down studies of
the Pakistan state, and the strength of the military and other so-
called elite forces and classes, continue to largely dominate scholarly
understanding of Pakistan’s political culture.3 Within this paradigm,
both Islamist political parties and ethnic movements, especially, are
simply understood as reactions to an existing political structure; they
are important not for the content of their ideologies but because of
the socio-economic conditions that have created them. This form of
argument is unlike that in other South Asian settings, especially India,
where a combination of high-level political and detailed local studies
has long been a feature of both historical and anthropological work,
and something that has generated new perspectives on the nature of
the interaction between religion and politics.4
As a result of both the rather sensationalist and disciplinary
divided nature of Pakistan studies, there have been few attempts
to understand the multi-dimensional nature of Pakistan’s political
and religious culture. Whilst most if not all scholars are more than
willing to describe Pakistan as a ‘complex cultural entity’, what this
means exactly for the form of the country’s political culture and the
composition of the Pakistan state remains unclear. Indeed, when
scholars do seek to elucidate on this complex issue their attentions
dwell on the relationship between the growing economic and political
dominance of Punjab and the impact this has had on ‘centre–province’
relations.5 Much of this work is sophisticated and convincing in
important ways, and it no longer treats Pakistan’s Punjab as an
essential and homogeneous entity in the way that earlier accounts
tended towards, yet its broader implications are rarely the subject
of sustained comment.6 For instance, it could now be speculated
3 Jalal’s historical accounts Pakistan’s political culture are the most sophisticated
works of this kind, see, especially, Jalal 1984, 1989 and 1995. Compare Samad 1995a.
4 Few accounts of Pakistan’s political culture seek to build on, for instance,
anthropological work in the country, whilst anthropologists have hitherto rarely
intervened in key debates about the state of Pakistan more generally. For one
anthropologist’s attempt to make broader conclusions about politics and society in
Pakistan see Lindholm 1996.
5 On the ‘Punjabisation’ of Pakistan, see Talbot 2001 and Samad 1995b.
6 Cloughly’s work on the dominance of the Punjab in the Pakistan Army, for
instance, shows how only a very limited proportion of the Punjab’s administrative
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that the growing political and economic dominance of the Punjab,
combined with the failure of ethno-nationalist parties andmovements
to maintain their influence in the non-Punjab provinces because of the
high degrees of ethnic diversity even within these regions, has meant
that diverse ‘Islamist’ parties with a broader Pakistan support base
are now amongst the most politically powerful movements that seek
to represent the aspirations and concerns of the North West Frontier
and Baluchistan provinces at Pakistan’s political centre.7
A more detailed exploration of this hypothesis could prove
informative, yet in order to give this important theme in the
study of Pakistan the significance it deserves scholars must also
explore concerns of broader importance. In this field of the study
of Pakistan there is an especially great need for more historically
informed accounts exploring how forms of cultural codification and
objectification initiated by the colonial state, and later adopted and
transformed after 1947, have shaped the contemporary claims of
cultural and religious collective entities and identities that are now
a dynamic feature of Pakistan’s political culture. These issues are so
complex and important in Pakistan because many Islamic movements
have sought to homogenise both Muslim thought and identity in the
country, and often depict any form of variation within the Muslim
umma in the country as a sign of weakness and lack of unity. Thus,
along with more detailed explorations of the forms taken by ‘cultural
diversity’ in Pakistan, there is also an urgent need to explore how
Muslims in Pakistan, especially those who support ‘Islamist’ parties,
conceptualise forms of identity rooted in locality and negotiate the
homogenising claims made upon them by Islamizing Muslims who
purport to represent abstract and religious types of collective entities.8
The relationship between the centre and the provinces, the role
played by cultural and religious collective entities and identities in
mediating this encounter, and the emergence of Islamist forms of
districts have benefited from a long-term relationship with Pakistan’s most important
state institution, see Cloughly 2000.
7 There is an informative body of literature on ‘ethno-nationalist’ movements
and parties in Pakistan’s non-Punjab provinces. For anthropological and historical
studies of ethnically Pukhtun political parties and movements, see Banerjee 2000
and Shah 1999, and on Baluch ‘ethno-nationalism’ and identity, see Harrison 1978
and Titus (ed.) 1997 and Titus 1999.
8 There is an emerging body of comparative historical literature now emerging
on the relationship between locality and abstract religious identity in the study of
Kashmir, see Rai 2004 and Zutshi 2004.
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identity, are all dimensions of life in contemporary Pakistan that have
increased in significance since the successes of the alliance of religious
parties (the MMA, or Muttahida Majlis-e Amal) in the October 2002
elections. This alliance was especially successful in the provinces of
Baluchistan and the NorthWest Frontier—regions that have long had
a tense and, sometimes, violent relationship with both the Pakistan
centre and, more generally, the Punjab. Yet even the success of the
MMA has thus far largely been conceptualised by both scholars and
popular commentators as the product of growing Islamic sentiment,
especially in Pukhtun-dominated regions, in the wake of the American
attacks on Afghanistan’s Taliban government.9 Analysts have also
emphasised the significance of the very real attemptsmadebyPakistan
military government to weaken the role of Pakistan’s ‘secular’ political
leadership, and the implications this had for the array of political
choices available to Pakistan’s electorate. There is a certain level of
truth in this explanation, but it also comfortably sits within an older
Orientalist paradigm of understanding Muslim politics, especially in
rural and relatively remote regions, as dominated by the intensity of
Muslim emotional responses and the instrumental power of elites,
and not by broader socio-economic processes and transformations and
thoughtful political decision-making. In making these assumptions,
this form of analysis of the complexity of the relationship between
Islam and politics in Pakistan conceals far more than it reveals about
the form of the country’s political culture today.
The full significance, I would contend, of the inroads made by
political parties in Pakistan with diverse types of Islamic platforms
can only be fully understood if a number of dynamic dimensions of
Pakistan’s political culture are examined in a more nuanced manner
than is usually the case. Above all else, perhaps, there is a great need
for scholars of the country to challenge assumptions concerning the
nature of political authority in Pakistan.10 Despite the ongoing power
and influence of the military and various elite classes, unique forms
of democratic process, thought and experience are an integral feature
of Pakistan’s political culture. The role played by critical political
debate cannot be underestimated in Pakistan, be it in the pulpits of
9 The paucity of current debate surrounding the success of the MMA in the
October 2002 elections is especially concerning considering Nasr’s excellent accounts
of the history of the Pakistan Jama’at-e Islami, see Nasr 1994 and 1996.
10 Recent anthropological accounts of so-called authoritarian regimes and states in
the Middle East have, for instance, advanced in theoretically sophisticated ways the
understanding of authoritarianism and ‘the state’.
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the country’s mosques, or in vernacular language university journals,
yet there have been few studies that have sought to capture the nature
of critical political engagement in Pakistan, and the implications this
has for understanding the nature of democracy and authoritarianism
in the country.
The presence of vibrant political discussion in Pakistan has meant is
that older forms of political culture and the forms of power relations
upon which they build have not gone uncontested in the country, and
that Pakistan is certainly not defined either by an archaic culture of
feudalism or by a ‘state’ Islamised in a one-dimensional manner.11
Yet until very recently, at least, the dominant way of conceptualising
emergent forms of religious politics in Pakistan revolved around
considerations of older and, indeed, important themes concerning
rural–urban migration, the experience of poverty and corruption,
the persistence of class and status divisions, and posited relationship
between these social dynamics and growing levels of support for
‘Islamist’ movements (e.g. Nasr 1992). As a result, what is lacking
in much of the literature is any attempt to understand the impact that
so-called religious parties and movements have had not simply on the
form of the relationship between Islam and state power in Pakistan,
or, indeed, on the everyday religious lives of Pakistan’s Muslims, but,
rather, on the nature of critical debate and democratic processes in
the country today. In this literature, the very nature of ‘Islamism’, the
lived experiences of the ‘jihadi’, the form taken by the Pakistan ‘state’,
and the dynamics of rural–urban migration, for instance, remained at
best unproblematised and at worst considered of little interest for the
understanding of Pakistan’s political culture.
The books under review here, however, in different ways, challenge
these assumptions and present detailed ethnographic and historical
accounts of Pakistan about dimensions of life in the country that
have rarely been the focus of sustained comment. Their first major
contribution is that they show how despite the constraints imposed
by prolonged and repetitive periods of military rule in Pakistan, new
forms of politicalmobilisation and action have emerged in the country,
sometimes with an ethnic orientation, at other times with an Islamic
one, and that these have played a central role in transforming the
nature of both the country’s political culture and the form of the
Pakistan state. They show how movements and political parties long
11 See Hansen 1999 and 2001 on Hindutva politics in Mumbai.
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dismissed as being excessively violent, traditionalist, primordialist or
even terrorist in their aims and organisation are, rather, the product
of modern and global changes that have affected Pakistan just as they
have countries with a more stable democratic history and political
culture. Moreover, in their analysis of this, they argue that despite
the ongoing strength of the military-bureaucratic elite in the country
Pakistan’s political culture can only be understood in relation to the
forms of transformation that diverse forms of democracy bring to a
culturally and politically diverse array of contemporary states and
societies.
The second major contribution of these works is their focus on
settings as well as classes of people in Pakistan that have rarely
been the focus of sustained research: the ulama, the urban youth,
and the rural as well as ‘diaspora’ disciples (muridan) of Sufi cults.
Importantly, they show convincingly how Pakistan people trained
as ‘religious scholars’, supporters of ethnic-based parties, and the
disciples of saint-like figures of spiritual charisma and authority are
not simple automatons instrumentally directed either by the Pakistan
state or unchanging and static religious and cultural traditions and
values. They are, rather, an active and creative part of the country’s
changing political culture. This is a critical development in the study of
Pakistan and one that has broader implication for the study of Muslim
politics in other settings.Despite somenotable exceptions, it continues
to be too often assumed by both popular commentators and scholars
that there are few possibilities for the living of creative lives within
Islam. Islam’s ‘men of learning and piety’ (the ulama), for instance,
continue to be conceptualised by many Islam specialists as merely
involved in ‘an endless round of interpretation and reinterpretation’
(Lindholm 2002: 124).
These books also challenge another major assumption about the
formof ‘Muslimpolitics’ in theworld today. Emergent forms ofMuslim
politics continue to be largely categorised as belonging to either
one or a combination of a number of narrow types ranging between
traditionalist Sufis, modernist and Westernizing Muslims, reformist
Islamists, and ‘neo-fundamentalist’ traditionalists (e.g.Roy1994). Yet
all of the books under review here show how Muslims in Pakistan at
least have creatively deployed, engaged, and challenged historically
important Islamic concepts, teachings and figures of authority in
ways that offer them the possibility of confronting the contemporary
problems they face in their everyday lives, and that Islam’s ulama are
themselves in engagement both with the world of politics and theology
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that entails the active and creative deployment of the intellect, and it
is to the men of learning and piety in Pakistan’s to which I now turn.
The Ulama in Contemporary Islam
Of the many works published on Islam, the state of the contemporary
Muslim world, and the politics of Pakistan in the aftermath of the
September 11th terrorist attacks on the US, Qasim Zaman’s The
Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, is one of the more
original contributions to this most important field of study. Focusing
on the role and influence of Islam’s ‘men of learning and piety’ (the
ulama) in British India, present day Pakistan, and other contemporary
Muslim-majority states, most notably Egypt, this is an ambitious work
of great relevance to historians of South Asia, scholars of the Muslim
world, and those with broader theoretical interests in the inter-
action between religion and politics in the modern world. The
book’s central argument is that the ulama in Pakistan are both an
influential force in the country’s politics and that they also contribute
in critical ways to both older and newer intellectual debates within
the Islamic tradition. Arguing such, it is a timely contribution to
our understanding of present day Pakistan, and provides an inter-
esting theoretical perspective to reflect on recent development in
the country’s current political climate: the October 2002 general
elections saw ulama-based parties securing considerable influence
at both the provincial and federal levels of the country’s political
organisation.
In the expanding body of literature on so-called Islamism,
fundamentalism and the Islamic revival in contemporary Pakistan,
there has been a lack of detailed work on the role played by the ulama
in the politics of the country (Nasr 2001; Jaffrelot 2001). Indeed,
more broadly, many Islam specialists have turned their analytical
focus away from Islam’s religious authorities to the central role
which they argue is being played by newly educated ‘lay’ Muslims in
political, social and intellectual debates emerging across the Muslim
world.12 Zaman, however, throws new light on the strategies employed
by the ulama in their engagement with politics in contemporary
Pakistan, and the ways in which they have set to the fraught task
of interacting both with colonial and post colonial regimes—many of
12 See, especially, Eickelman and Anderson (ed.) 1999.
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which have been deeply suspicious of religion and the activities of
Islam’s ‘men of learning and piety’. The author does not, however,
fall into the well worn trap of neglecting the complex role of religious
thought in the ‘politicisation’ of Islam by Pakistan’s ulama: Zaman
also seeks to emphasise the ongoing intellectual impact that the
ulama have on styles of Islamic thought and disputation. By exploring
this important issue, Zaman at once both avoids labelling Pakistan’s
religious authorities as ‘unthinking’ jihadis as well as alerting us to the
need to challenge the notion that expanding levels of mass education
in Muslim-majority states has inevitably resulted in the weakening of
the ulama’s authority as well as intellectual influence.
A central component of the argument of this complex book is
that the ulama in South Asia, far from being a stagnant force
unable to interact with the conditions of modernity, are, rather,
capable of change and adaptation in current conditions of socio-
political transformation. In arguing such, Zaman provides both new
theoretical perspectives as well as in-depth material on the notions of
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, and the role they are playing in discourses
about the so-called ‘Islamic revival’. By analysing important textual
material produced by South Asia’s ulama over the past century, Zaman
convincingly shows that in the face of growing levels of education and
regimes hostile to their position in society, the ulama have sought
to define ‘religion’ as a separate sphere and themselves as ‘religious
specialists’. Zaman argues that both of these developments are highly
novel, and that by embarking on such a course of action the ulama have
been successful in maintaining and indeed enhancing their influence
as political and religious agents in contemporary Pakistan. Zaman
recognises, however, the ambiguity and paradoxes of the ulama’s role
in the construction of ‘religion’ as a separate sphere of life distinct
from the state. For, at the same time as separating the domain of
religion from other fields of society, they have also sought to expand
their role and influence in society. One of the ways they have set to this
task is by seeking to play a more central role in defining the ‘Islamic
state’ and securing their place in such a political entity.
In order to resolve this tension Zaman situates his arguments
concerning the continuing influence of the ulama in Pakistan in a
broader comparative perspective. It is becoming increasingly apparent
that the form taken by the so-called ‘Islamic revival’ across theMuslim
world is diverse, and that this diversity is in large part a product of the
ways in which contrasting states in the Muslim world have sought to
harness Islam and the ulama for their own political ends. In this book
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Zamanmakes original and fruitful comparisons between Pakistan and
Egypt of the type we rarely see in more narrowly focused writing on
Pakistan. He argues that whilst the ulama in Pakistan have largely
been successful in preventing the state from penetrating into the
country’s institutions of religious learning (the madrassas), in Egypt
the progressive incorporation of the religious university of Al Azhar
into the Egyptian state has resulted in a greater weakening of the
strength and independence of the ulama. Zaman argues that it is the
lack of a central seat of Islamic learning in Pakistan that has meant
that the Pakistan state’s attempts to regulate the activities of the
ulama in the country have been less successful than those of successive
modernising Egyptian regimes. In the context of the intensity of
current debate in Pakistan and the US concerning the effectiveness of
President Musharaf’s attempts to transform the nature of Pakistan’s
complex network of madrassas, Zaman’s discussion of this issue is both
convincing and informative.
One of the greatest problems facing Pakistan over the past twenty
years has been the escalation of Sunni–Shi’a violence: a combination
of target killings, riots and warfare-like conflict involving Shi’a and
Sunni Muslims have brought chaos to many regions of the country. In
Karachi duringMay2004 alone over fifty peoplewere killed in violence
between the city’s Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. So in Chapter 5 Zaman
provides an important analytical contribution to our understanding
of sectarian conflict in Pakistan. Zaman questions approaches to the
analysis of Shi’a–Sunni violence in Pakistan which argue that such
conflict reflects above all else the country’s political history. Nasr has
recently argued that it is those factions of the ulama-centred parties
that opposed the creation of Pakistan, who have been most important
in the escalation of sectarian conflict over the past two decades (Nasr
2000). Such factions of the ulama have vilified Shi’a Muslims in the
country as a threat to what they say is a Sunni dominated and inspired
Pakistan. Embarking on such a course of action, Nasr suggests, has
created for these movements a secure wedge in Pakistan’s political
system because they have been able to represent themselves as the
sole defenders of a homogeneous and pure Sunni Pakistan. They have,
thus, sought to make themselves the rightful protectors of Sunnism
and Pakistan—two projects that now neatly fall into one.
Zaman has serious reservations about this argument, and whilst not
dismissing it he suggests that such an approach’s central weakness
is that it fails to encompass the broader aims and goals of sectarian-
oriented and ulama-based religious parties in Pakistan. By focusing
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on a region of Pakistan that lies at the very heart of Shi’a–Sunni
conflict in the contemporary Muslim world, the Jhang district of the
Punjab, Zaman argues that the ulama have sought to generate anti-
Shi’a sentiment there in order to accomplish two goals. First, following
other scholars of Islamism in Pakistan, especially Nasr, Zaman argues
that by ‘radicalising’ Muslim identities along sectarian lines some
of the Sunni ulama have sought to weaken the political status and
fortunes of wealthy Shi’a landlords, and, thus, create a niche for an
expanding Sunni merchant middle class. Yet Zaman also argues that
the sectarian profile of this deeply sensitive region is more complex
than this argument suggests, and whilst many of Jhang’s merchant
middle class are Sunnis, there are also Shi’as amongst them.13 So,
secondly, and perhapsmore creatively, Zaman suggests that by seeking
to radicalise Sunni identities in this and perhaps other regions of
Pakistan, such anti-Shi’a Sunni ulama have also sought to further the
influence that reform-minded schools of Islamic thought have in the
country, most especially the Deoband ‘school’ established in India in
1867. Arguing that the teachings of the Deoband school have had,
until recently, only a thin support base in rural regions of Pakistan,
Zaman proposes that more than simply existing as a strategic political
tool, sectarianism in Pakistan has also played a major role in the
penetration of revivalist and reform-oriented Islamic teachings and
styles of religiosity into rural areas of the country (p. 135).
An important dimension of Zaman’s discussion of Shi’a–Sunni
sectarianism is the distinction he makes between the ‘high ranking’
ulama and the ‘peripheral’ ulama, between those ‘who have devoted
themselves primarily to academic pursuits’ and others who ‘wage
sectarian battles on the street’. This distinction is not, of course, new
either to the study of Islam or Pakistan, but one of the strengths
of Zaman’s use of these terms is that he actively seeks to show
what he sees as the high levels of interconnectivity between these
classes of ulama. ‘The leading religious scholars do not say that the
Shi’is should be killed, only that they are infidels in light of their
vilification of certain early Islamic figures as well as some of their other
beliefs. But enough justification is thereby provided to the peripheral
ulama and their operatives—who are often little more than mercenary
13 Abou Zahab 2002 seeks to explain sectarian conflict in the southern Punjab in
relation to economic deprivation in thewake of theGreenRevolution in the 1970s, the
status and class changes this has engendered, and the growing numbers of Deobandi
madrassas in the region.
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terrorists on both sides—wage an ongoing war against their sectarian
opponents’ (P. 133). As social scientists are now placing greater
emphasis on understanding the nature of the complex networks that
stretch behind the movements and organisations of Islamic revival,
and Muslim identity more generally, Zaman’s detailed case studies
provide fascinating comparativematerial for scholars of otherMuslim-
majority states and Muslim communities elsewhere.
Zaman’s contribution to our understanding of what he labels as
the ‘radicalisation’ of Sunni identity in Pakistan, and the active role
that he suggests the ulama have in this process is important, and it is
likely to be a major contribution to the field of Islamic and Pakistan
studies for many years to come. Yet it also raises broader questions
and points to significant gaps in our understanding of the nature of
Muslim thought, politics, and identity, as well as the role of the ulama
in the contemporary Muslim world, and it is to these issues to which I
now turn.
First, Zaman does suggest a certain degree of exchange between
Sunni and Shi’a symbolism and religious language—even Sunni
organisations such as the deeply anti-Shi’a Sipah-e Sahaba-e Pakistan,
he suggests, place a devotional emphasis on the companions of the
Prophet that is similar to the passion with which Shi’a Muslims revere
their Imams. His study, however, focuses above all else on the nature
of religious discourse produced by reform-minded, shari’a-centred and
revivalist ulama. He argues, indeed, that the madrassa has replaced
the Sufi shrine as the focal point of Muslim networks in Pakistan.
What is lacking here is a consideration of the complex and multi-
dimensional ways in which Pakistan’s ulama have used, incorporated
and in the process transformed the doctrines, symbols, and practices
of Sufi-influenced Islamic texts and teachings in their revivalist
discourses. In my experience of life in the Chitral region of northern
Pakistan, even Deobandi educated ulama are often known as expert
amulet makers, whilst members of the reform-minded Jama’at-e
Islami party enjoy earning reputations as writers and performers of
styles of love poetry and music deeply infused with the language of
classic Persian Sufi texts. Sufi thought and practice continues to be a
powerful source of faith and values in South Asian Islam, and there
remains great diversity in styles of Muslim religiosity and identity
available to believers in contemporary Pakistan. A more complete
understanding of the role played by faith and religious passion in
the construction of ‘radicalised’ Muslim identities and the religio-
political activism of the ulama must seek to address the complex and
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challenging issue concerning the extent to which the transmission and
synthesis of religious ideas and values continues to take place even in
the context of hardened sectarian boundaries and violent conflict.
Such an approach would allow for an even deeper understanding
of the ‘mercenary terrorists’ responsible for so much blood shed in
contemporary Pakistan.
Second, whilst Zaman clearly demonstrates the continuing im-
portance of the ulama in the Muslim world, and provides interesting
explanations for the great differences seen in the nature of the ulama’s
status and role in the diverse Muslim-majority settings, the ways in
which Muslims living in both rural and urban settings in Pakistan
respond to and receive the ulama’s sermons, calls to commitment,
legal injunctions and Islamising messages remain largely unexplored.
Nowhere more important is it that we approach this challenging issue
than in the context of Shi’a–Sunni as well as other forms of sectarian
conflict in present day Pakistan. For whilst moments of violence
betweenSunni andShi’aMuslims inPakistan are nowa regular feature
of the country’s social landscape, there aremany regions of the country
where Sunnis and Shi’as continue to live peacefully together, and it is
in no sense possible to argue that the violent nature of Sunni–Shi’a
relations is a ‘routinised’ and inevitable feature of life in the country.
If certain sections of the ulama have sought to radicalise Sunni and
Shi’a identities across Pakistan, then how successful have they been in
their efforts, and how far do Muslims in the country see these men as
authentic founts of pure Islam? Or, on the other hand, to what degree
do ‘ordinary Muslims’ attempt to contest the calls to commitment of
Islam’smen of learning and authority, and how far are the responses of
Muslims to the Islamisingmessages of the certain sections of the ulama
about either deference or resistance in a simple and one-dimensional
sense?
Nevertheless, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam will undoubtedly
provoke greater interest in the role played by the ulama in politico-
religious activism in the Muslim world, and spawn lively debate
concerning the form taken by the Islamic tradition in contemporary
Pakistan.
Migrants and Militants
The second book under discussion here presents a very different
perspective as to who are the key movers in Pakistan’s present day
political culture.OskarVerkaaik’sMigrants andMilitants: Fun andUrban
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Violence in Pakistan, is a sensitive and much awaited subtle historical
and ethnographic study of the Muhajir Qawami Movement (MQM).
The MQM is an ‘ethnic-based’ party that has played a central role
in Pakistan’s politics over the past twenty years, especially in the
southern cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. It is also often associated
with the killings and violence that destabilised the city of Karachi
over the course of this most volatile period in the city’s history.
The MQM’s leader, Altaf Hussein, now based in a north London
suburb, is the source of great debate amongst Pakistanis from an
array of social backgrounds: referred to by many non-Muhajirs as a
‘terrorist’ protected by a hypocritical British government, and revered
by many Muhajirs as a brave protector of the rights of Urdu-speaking
Muslimmigrants in Pakistan, the leader of theMQM is never far from
controversy in the country today, yet his role in the emergence and
political success of the MQM has rarely been the focus of sustained
scholarly comment.
Verkaaik’s work addresses this significant gap in the literature
on the development of Pakistan’s political culture since the 1970s.
The work is especially commendable because it is based on first-hand
fieldwork in one of the country’s most dangerous regions, and during
especially sensitive moments in Pakistan’s recent history. As with
Zaman’s work, this book focuses on a section of Pakistan society that
has largely been ignored in many accounts of the country’s political
history: the urban unemployed and underemployed youth. Indeed, in
more general treatments of politics in the Muslim world, and in some
detailed articles on ‘Islamism’ in Pakistan (Nasr 2002), such folk
are often simply assumed to be unthinking and disoriented cannon
fodder for Islamist political parties. Yet the picture Verkaaik presents
is both more theoretically complex and ethnographically compelling
than this older teleological and one-dimensional argument: he argues
that the urban youth of the Pakistan’s southern city ofHyderabad have
played a central role in the region’s and indeed the country’s recent
political fortunes. Neither resisting or unthinkingly following either
the country’s powerful religious or more ‘secular’ parties, they have,
rather, constructed a symbolic andmeaningful place for themselves in
what is often stereotyped as being Pakistan’s elite-governed political
system. Furthermore, they have done so not simply by imitating or
replicating the structures and ideas of other political parties in the
country in line with their own concerns, but rather through creative
forms of activity channelled through the deployment of discourses and
experiences of ‘fun’. This ‘fun’, however, also has a darker side: the
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division between fun and violence is a slippery one for Verkaaik, and it
is only in the ecstatic play of the MQM’s support base that the violent
tactics of the MQM can be fully understood.
This argument is important and, indeed, resonates with my work in
a very different setting in contemporary Pakistan: Khowar-speaking
villagers living in the mountainous villages of Chitral in the north of
the country.What I found inChitral was that young and comparatively
well-educated village Muslims did not automatically turn towards
Islamist and piety-inclined movements as so many accounts of the
Muslim world currently suggest.14 Many if not all of them were,
rather, critical of both the teachings and the practices of Muslims
they themselves referred to as ‘hardened’ and ‘extremist’. The young
villagemenwith whom I lived did not simply reject ‘Islamism’:many of
Chitral’s youth ( juanan) did join preaching tours with the worldwide
movement of Islamic reform and purification, the Tabligh-e Jama’at.
Yet they were also active participators in the various types of musical
programmes that aremuch loved bymany Chitral people but the focus
of sustained opposition from the region’s Islamizing ‘bearded ones’,
and creative producers of poetry and song. Indeed, the lyrics of their
music often sought to engage in intellectually creative and critical ways
with both what they conceptualised to be the hypocritical dimensions
of the ways in which Islam was practiced in the region, and Chitral’s
status as a neglected and marginal region of a Pukhtun-dominated
Frontier province and a Punjab-domainted Pakistan.15
Such findings have important implications not just for our under-
standing of the comparative strength of ‘Islamism’ in present-day
Pakistan, but also for the ways in which social scientists conceptualise
Pakistan’s broader political culture. Unlike some other commentators
of Pakistan who continue to assume that the ‘basic structure’ of
Pakistan’s political system has remained unchanged as a result of
political power remaining lodged in the hands of feudal, business and
military elites, Verkaaik claims that theMQMneeds to be understood
as a political movement that has emerged in the context of important
political changes in Pakistan. As with the Hindutva parties and
organisations in India, Verkaaik analyses the emergence of theMQM,
and their street culture of politics in the 1980s and 1990s in Pakistan
is a form of democratic movement. In so doing, Verkaaik makes a
significant step in the anthropology of Pakistan: whilst several notable
14 See Marsden 2005.
15 See Marsden forthcoming.
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historical and political analyses of the country have sought to challenge
the notion that Pakistan is a distinct, indeed unique, form of political
entity to its ‘democratic’ Indian neighbour ( Jalal 1995), there have
been few detailed studies of Pakistan’s political culture that have
sought to explore how, if at all, such an argument is relevant to the
everyday forms of politics of ordinary Pakistanis.Moreover, by showing
how the MQM is in no simple sense a primordial ethnic party, but,
rather, the manifestation of a particular form of political action in
Pakistan, and, as such, reflects transformations in Pakistan state and
society, Verkaaik is also able to explore the changes that the political
culture of the MQM has undergone since its creation. Rather than
one-dimensional depicting the party as a movement of violence and
terrorism, he shows how whilst initially the movement was one of
youth mobilisation, its violent and anti-state activities and dimensions
grew in importance through the 80s and 90s as it became increasingly
pressurised by hostile Pakistani political regime, and, in more recent
times, the MQM is now increasingly turning away from violence and
exclusivist ethnic politics and seeking to build bridges with those it
was once hostile to, especially Sindhi dominated political parties and
movements.
Verkaaik also connects his discussion of the rise of the MMA in
Karachi to the place of status and division amongst Muhajirs in
Pakistan. This is a critical dimension of Pakistan society. Yet its polit-
ical and symbolic significance in Pakistan’s political culture has too
often been sidelined by older and somewhat repetitive debates
concerning the extent to which it is possible to conceptualise forms
of social hierarchy in Muslim societies as manifestations of Hindu-
like ‘caste’ formations (Lindholm 1996). The scholarly exploration
of this important issue has not been helped by hostility in ‘Islamic’
Pakistan to the very notion that caste-like forms of social distinction
remain vibrant in a ‘modern’ Muslim society. As a result, whilst often
polemical debates have raged in the study of contemporary India over
the extent to which the origins of caste lie in religious values, Indian
history, or colonial rule (e.g.Dirks2001), and the degree towhich caste
identities are flexible in the face of modernity and social change (e.g.
S. Bayly 1998), the importance of these issues in the recent political
history of Pakistan have been largely overlooked. This represents a
significant lacuna in our understanding of the country, not least in
relation to the emergence ofmass support for ‘Islamic’ political parties
in the country, and the victory of the MMA in constituencies where
powerful and high status formerly princely families have maintained
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a hold on power for much if not all of the past century (for instance,
Swat, Dir, and Chitral). Yet hitherto most analyses of growing support
for Pakistan’s Islamist parties are based on narrow understandings
of class conflict and political strategy. Most especially analyses claim
that there is growingmiddle class support for the Islamising policies of
‘religious parties’, such as the Jama’at-e Islami, and that this has also
resulted in subsequent attemptsmade by supposedlymore established
parties, especially the Muslim league, to wrest this support from the
Islamists by using Islamic symbols and initiating Islamising policies.
Whilst Verkaaik does not deal with this complex issue directly,
what he does do is to present an equally important discussion of the
importance of status distinctions in the emergence of the MQM party
and its support base amongst Urdu-speaking migrants to Pakistan. In
so doing, he goes a long way in challenging the notion that the MQM
and other parties like it thrive on any simple form of ethnic identity
and community in Pakistan, emphasising, rather, the tensions and
conflicts embedded in such linguistic and neighbourhood forms of
collective identity. It is widely known that the MQM’s support base is
almost exclusively amongst Indian Muslims who moved to Pakistan as
refugees (muhajirs) with the partition of India in 1947. Yet Verkaaik’s
work on the large and important Muhajir community in Hyderabad
is the first work that explores in detail the tensions, anxieties and
divisions that underlie any simple notion held both by scholars and
the Pakistani media more generally, of their being any ‘pure’ Muhajir
community in Hyderabad or elsewhere. This key ethnographic
chapter is important: the divisions and tensions between Muhajirs in
Pakistan are too often overlooked in scholarly writing on the country.
In chapter 3 Verkaaik provides an evocative discussion of the
tensions within the Hyderabadi Muhajir community: distinctions
between Sunni and Shi’a, high status and low status, and Muhajirs
hailing from the Indian cities of Ajmer and Agra reveal the conflictual
nature of everyday social relations amongst Muhajirs in the city, and
Verkaaik documents how what he calls ‘the politics of insult and
prejudice’ played themselves out in the daily life of the city’s Mujhajir
community. This is important because it provides the historical
backdrop before which the MQM emerged as a powerful force for the
mobilization and empowerment—albeit uneven—of the city’s youth.
But it is also important because status distinction and competition
must be seen as central to the nature of society and politics in Pakistan
more generally, and Verkaaik, through discussions of the use of insults
such as ‘black’ (kaliya) shows how the ‘politics of insult’ wasmasterfully
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turned on its head through parody and fun and deployed for very
different purposes by ‘the youth’ who went on to form the bulk of the
MQM movement in the eighties and nineties.
The book also a makes a significant contribution to the under-
standing of the interaction between Islam and ethnicity in Pakistan.
Scholars of Pakistan are often rightly bewildered by the diverse and
competing forms of Muslim political parties, identities and traditions
in the country, and the degree of conflict and tension between these. All
too often, divisions between ‘high’ and ‘low’ Islam, ‘Islamist’ and ’neo-
fundamentalist’ religious parties, and ‘modernist’ and ‘traditional’
forms of Muslim identity are treated by scholars of the country as
separate and incommensurable wholes that are mapped onto society
in Pakistan in a one-dimensional and self-defining way. Verkaaik’s
analysis of this remarkably multi-layered religious setting is far
more convincing. He shows how the MQM promoted a Muslim
identity that was ‘a paradoxical reconciliation of complimentary but
contradictory discourses on Muslim nationalism and ethnic solidarity,
Islamic modernism and Sufism’ (p. 185), and that this reconciliation
of complex and seemingly incompatible sets of discourses was made
possible by the creative fun which lay at the heart of the MQM’s
mode of political action. In arguing such, Verkaaik allows us to
think in new ways about the role played by religious symbolism
and authority in Pakistan’s multi-layered political culture. First, and
most generally, he shows how those who have argued that Pakistan’s
political culture is one-dimensionally saturated by Islamic symbols
and discourses which have for years been given heightened capital
and value by the intermittently Islamizing state are simplistic at
best. Rather, Verkaaik’s book asks more penetrating questions about
how such symbols and discourses are reproduced, manipulated and
even parodied by the country’s politicians and their supporters, and
one domain of political life in Pakistan where Verkaaik’s arguments
are especially insightfully is in relation to the nature of Sunni–Shi’a
relations as conceptualised by muhajirs.
Indeed, in relation to the study of sectarian conflict in Pakistan,
Verkaaik’s work in some ways starts where Zaman’s ended. The
ethnographic focus of Verkaaik’s book means that it includes material
and analysis lacking in other less situated accounts of the nature of
Shi’a–Sunni violence in contemporary Pakistan. Verkaaik documents
in a nuanced way the interplay between discourses of sectarian and
ethnic identity both in moments of violent conflict and in political
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mobilisation in Pakistan more generally.16 His book is important
at two major levels. First, he shows how complex and intricate
the relationship between supposedly sectarian and ethnic forms of
conflict both in Pakistan’s recent and earlier history are. In his
discussion of a Shi’a–Sunni riot in Hyderabad in 1955, for instance,
we learn how clear-cut accusations by Hyderabad people of sectarian
violence seemingly faultlessly merged into a broader discourse of
accusation and counter accusation by both Muhajirs and Sindhis of
the other’s essential Shi’aness. Second, he documents in detail how
what are usually said to be deeply Shi’a symbols, values and forms
of emotion, are, in southern urban Pakistan at least, deployed for
political mobilisation and motivation by parties that in no simple
sense are ‘Shi’a’: martyrdom, the evoking of the Karbala narrative
and ethic, and the use of Shi’a-like bodily dispositions and clothing
form one critical way in which the MQM garnered support for its
notion that the Muhajirs are a maligned ethnic group in what they
conceptualise as a Punjab-dominated Pakistan. What we are left with,
then, is a suspicion that much of what is often called sectarian conflict
in Pakistan is less about radicalised Shi’a and Sunni identities per se,
or, indeed, the inevitable result of any simple configuration ofmaterial
factors, than forms of conflict in which narratives of accusation and
counter accusation are central.
In summary, Verkaaik’s book is the first in-depth study of the MQM
movement, and provides material about the MQM and the lives
and dispositions of its supporters that have hitherto not been the
focus of scholarly research. In so doing, Verkaaik goes a long way in
transforming our understanding of the movement as simply a ‘violent’
‘ethnic’ party to a more grounded approach that explores in detail
the economic, cultural, political and religious tensions that lay behind
the emergence of the MQM and the killings with which it became
associated in the eighties and nineties. The book is important for
the contemporary understanding of Pakistan more broadly because
it is the first ethnographically informed historical study of a political
party in a country where, despite years of military rule, affiliation to
and membership of political parties remains a salient feature of both
personal and collective identity. It does, thus, significantly add to our
understanding of the impact of new forms of political mobilisation
16 For an anthropological analysis of Sunni–Shi’a relations in another urban setting
in Pakistan, Gilgit in the Northern Areas, see Sokefeld 1999.
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on public life in a so-called ‘authoritarian state’. For anthropologists
interested in the study of urban politics, the book’s central argument
is a significant contribution to the anthropological study of political
violence and the understanding of militant movements.
Pilgrims of Love
Pnina Werbner’s Pilgrims of Love: The Anthropology of a Global Sufi Cult
advances a very different understanding to both Zaman and Verkaaik
of the role played by religion in the everyday lives of PakistaniMuslims,
living both inside the country and elsewhere, especially in the United
Kingdom. Werbner’s work questions especially Zaman’s claim that
the reformist madrassah has replaced the Sufi lodge as central to the
nature of Islamic networks in Pakistan. Werbner, rather, provides a
detailed and first-hand account of a Sufi lodge that appears to be a
thriving and dynamic feature of Pakistan society. Moreover, the Sufi
centre thatWerbner visited in the early1990s is not located in a region
of Pakistan where the Sufi tradition is recognised as being especially
influential: the lodge of ZindaPir, rather, is located in theKohat region
of the country’s NorthWest Frontier Province. Yet the followers of the
lodge come from many regions of Pakistan, and the lodge itself has
branches in an array of exceptionally diverse Pakistani settings. Most
strikingly these include locations such as what is usually assumed to
be the Deobandi dominated Dir district of the Frontier. In relation
to the study of Pakistan, however, what is especially fascinating is
that this brotherhood not only has followers from different regions
of Pakistan, but also frequently brings them together in moments of
shared religious ritual, and that this occurs despite the differences of
the settings from which the followers of the saint hail.
Indeed, the overwhelmingly Pakistan-centred orientation of the
‘cult’, both within Pakistan and beyond appears so strong inWerbner’s
account, that it makes one wonder whether this is, from the perspec-
tives of the followers themselves, the global religious movements that
the title of Werbner’s book claims. Of course, ‘reformist’ movements
such as the Tabligh-e Jama’at and more politically oriented Islamist
parties have been involved in the creation of global networks over
the past fifty years.17 Yet what Werbner documents is especially
interesting because there have been few interregional studies of
17 See Roy and Abou Zahab 2004.
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Sufi cults in Pakistan: Islam specialists usually argue that Islamic
reformism is themain force behind the homogenisation of the thinking
and practices of Pakistan’s Muslims, not the activities of the Sufi
brotherhood. Moreover, the murids of the ‘cult’ of Zinda Pir are not
simply villageMuslims untouched by the teachings of reformist Islam,
they are, rather, from all regions of Pakistan, many of them migrants
to Britain, and some of the key leaders within the movement affiliated
themselves to it during their careers both as officers and soldiers
in the Pakistan Army. Thus, whilst Pilgrims of Love contains a rich
body of material on Sufism and Islam in Pakistan and its diasporic
communities, it is less instructive on the form taken by present day
constructions of Pakistani national identity and the vexed question
concerning how these relate to variations in regional and religious
identity in the country.
There are, however, some problems with the approach taken by
Werbner in regard to this most important and complex of issues.
Most obviously, perhaps, there is little recognition of the broader
religious and social context of Zinda Pir’s lodge. Werbner’s research
in Pakistan was undertaken in a complex cultural and political
region where both Pashto and Punjabi are important local spoken
languages. Unfortunately, the ways in which affiliation to this Sufi
lodge transcends cultural and linguistic divides in Pakistan do not form
any part of themain argument of the book, despite the fact that ethnic-
linguistic conflict has occupied such a central part of life in Pakistan
over the past twenty years. This is perhaps an issue of even more
considerable importance when one takes into considerationWerbner’s
focus on Pakistan’s ‘diaspora communities’. Locality politics are even a
central feature of political life in Pakistani and diasporic communities,
and, as anybody who has surveyed web chat rooms frequented by
Pakistanis in Britain will know, the tensions and conflicts between
British Pakistanis of ‘Pukhtun’ and ‘Punjabi’ descent are as, if not
more, powerful in the streets of Birmingham as they are in the
bazaars of Peshawar. How the followers of Zinda Pir negotiated and
conceptualised such issues would have added a further important
theme to this work.
Moreover, whilst Werbner’s attempt to complicate our understand-
ing of the interaction between Sufi and reformist Islam is successful,
there is a greater need to recognise that Kohat is a region of Pakistan
where madrassas teaching relatively hard line interpretations of Islam
are now powerful and influential. Indeed, one would presume that
returnee madrassa students do form a part of the religious horizons of
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the people with whomWerbner lived, both in Pakistan and in Britain.
Moreover, especially in settings such as Dir where both the Afghan
Taliban and the PakistanMMAhave been and continue to be powerful
and influential, the degree to which the followers of Sufi cults have to
contend with more reform-oriented fellow Frontier people would, one
would imagine, be central to understanding the dynamics of the cult of
Zinda Pir. Yet Werbner is of the opinion that the power of Pakistan’s
‘Islamist’ parties is over exaggerated. Indeed, their only realmention is
in a footnote, when she notes that the ‘religious parties’ in Pakistan are
‘not strong’ and that their successes in the 2002 elections were above
all else to dowith ‘unusual’ circumstances, includingAmerica’s attacks
on Afghanistan and the military government’s attempt to weaken
the country’s more established political leadership. Such a cursory
dismissal is over simplistic. As I have suggested above, such arguments
conceal the socio-economic factors that have played a powerful role
in making the MMA political force in the Frontier, at the same time
as obscuring the ideological dimensions of the MMA which for some
if not all Frontier Muslims make the movement a politically, if not
necessarily religiously, persuasive one.18 In short, both the relationship
between ‘Islamic’, national and region identity, and the interaction
between religious politics and social transformation in Pakistan is
more complex than Werbner’s analysis suggests.
In the context of this article, however, what I am interested in most
is the significance that Werbner’s detailed ethnographic study has, or
rather could have, for our understanding of contemporary Pakistan. In
this regard the book, somewhat inevitably given its lofty philosophical
and anthropological goals, is less informative, and, on some occasions,
one wonders how far Werbner is prepared to recognise the influence
that Pakistan as a cultural, political and religious entity has on her Sufi
informants. Much of the material in the book could have been used to
argue decisive points about the nature of contemporary Pakistan, but
Werbner prefers to focus on the anthropology of religion and a critique
of ‘post-modern’ theory. Thus, I now reflect on the implications of some
of her ethnography for the understanding of contemporary Pakistan.
This is especially the case regarding the fascinating issue concerning
the close relationships between the ‘cult’ of Zinda Pir and the Pakistan
Army. The central lodge of the Zinda Pir lodge is located close to the
important Pakistan Army cantonment town of Kohat, and Werbner
18 For an insightful critique of dominant understandings and explanations of
‘political Islam’ in the social sciences, see Hirschkind 1997.
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discusses how many men in the army came to know of and eventually
affiliate themselves with the ‘cult’ during their time in the Pakistan
Army, as both soldiers and officers. Indeed, many of these figures,
including the saintly head of the movement in Britain, went on to
play an important role in the ‘cults’ development. This is all striking:
recent accounts of the Pakistan Army have largely claimed, especially
since General Zia’s time as the country’s military President, that
the Army has increasingly become dominated by a type of middle
class, Islamist inclined, often rural, young officer, who is hostile to
the teachings and practices of so-called ‘popular’ and ‘Sufi’ Islam,
and, instead, highly influenced by the ideologies of parties such as
the Jama’at-e Islami.19 Indeed, in more recent years, some journalists
have suggested that some officers in the Pakistan Army have now
started to turn towards even more ‘extremist’ forms of Islamic faith
and actionwhich emphasise in an even clearer way the role that violent
struggle and strict interpretations of the Islamic legal code should
play in the living of a Muslim life in Pakistan. Of course one of the
great problems with this approach is that it assumes that Pakistan’s
newly educated and now urban-based rural folk homogeneously turn
towards the teachings of ‘reformism’ when their economic, class, and
educational status undergoes an upward change. This is why the very
different dynamic between the army and religion taking place in the
context of a global Sufi brotherhood is such an interesting dimension
of Werbner’s book, and there appears to be the potential of arguing
that recent accounts of the Pakistan Army have over homogenised the
role of Islam and the type of Muslim important within it, and over
simplified the forms of religious conflict important at a number of
different levels within the Army’s organisational structure.
Conclusion
Two major points emerge from this discussion of recent literature to
emerge on the state of contemporary Pakistan. First, in relation to the
understanding of Islam in Pakistan, what all the books reviewed show
is that it is no longer sufficient to simply emphasise either the diverse
cultural variations important in Pakistan that impact on the complex
form taken by the Islamic tradition in Pakistan, or to conceptualise
Pakistan as dominated and divided by competing Islamic sectarian
19 For one of the first such accounts of this process of change in the Pakistan Army,
see Cohen 1998.
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identities and doctrines. The Muslims whose lives are explored in
these books are Muslim in ways that are neither the product of an
ethnicizing state, nor the efforts of Islamizing movements. Rather,
there is a greater degree of flexibility and creativity in the ways in
which Pakistan people think about Islam than is usually assumed. This
is not simply something that is contained within any ideo-typical realm
of personal religion but, rather, impacts in profound and important
ways on the different strategies the country’s Muslims have deployed
in order to engage themselves in movements of political mobilisation.
Second, it is now also clear that older social science conceptual-
izations which depict Pakistan as an authoritarian state with little or
no space for democratic values or processes, have hindered the state
of scholarly understandings of Pakistan, and, more generally, work on
the nature of democracy in postcolonial countries more generally. In
particular there is an urgent need to explore the complex relationship
between the nature of the Pakistan state, the form taken by centre–
province relationships in the country, and the interaction between this
and the supposed growing support for parties with a so-called ‘Islamist’
platform in the country. Until now Islamist movements in Pakistan
have been too easily depicted either as in a symbiotic relationship
with the military or in opposition to the elite classes and forces of the
‘praetorian’ Pakistan state. Consequently, their influence on
Pakistan’s political culture, and the form taken by critical political
debate in the country have been both underestimated and under-
theorised.
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